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Russian Federation: Political Parties 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Fewer... or more? 
A plethora of party gatherings, current and planned, finds its common 
denominator in slogans that are strikingly repetitious, while avoiding the 
revelation of policy aims... if any. 
 
At an end-of-November congress, the Unity party and the Fatherland-All Russia 
movement will join forces and form a single centrist party. Currently called the 
Unity-Fatherland Union, the new party's name will be established at the 
congress. According to the secretary of the Fatherland Movement's Political 
Council and secretary of the Unity-Fatherland's General Council, Alexander 
Vladislavlev, the main tasks of the new political entity will be "to carry on a 
constructive dialogue with the authorities and to share responsibility with them for 
everything happening in the country" as well as to "uphold the interests of the 
country and the people." Vyacheslav Volodin, the leader of the Duma's 
Fatherland - All Russia faction, noted that together the two parties "will be able to 
do more by united efforts than separately." He added that the new united centrist 
party would be represented broadly in the next parliament. (ITAR-TASS, 1245 
GMT, 3 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1003, via World News Connection) 
 
According to other sources, a third, so far undisclosed, political movement will 
join the ranks of the new pro-government party, pushing the forces of the right, 
such as Boris Nemtsov's Union of Right Forces, out of the political mainstream. 
(ORT, 3 Oct 01; via www.ortv.ru) 
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Another political transformation already has taken place. On 29 September, at its 
second congress (attended by about 600 deputies), the People's Deputy 
movement became the People's Party of Russia (NPRF). Gennady Raikov was 
elected as the party's leader, and a central committee and a presidium were 
established. State Duma Deputy Anatoly Aksakov explained that "the party's 
ideology will be based on general human values, while an end to poverty and 
establishment of law and order in Russia will be its key goals and tasks." He 
expects that the People's Party will "gain a great number of votes at the next 
general elections, since [it] is a party of deputies from single-member 
constituencies, whose prestige is strong in regions." (ITAR-TASS, 1753 GMT, 25 
Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0925, via World News Connection) 
 
Around the same time, the People's Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR), which 
consists of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the 
Agrarian Party of Russia, organized a congress to outline its plan of action for 
2002. In opening the congress, CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov urged all who 
"consider themselves patriots" to unite forces in order "jointly to find a way to a 
new level of resolving the problems" facing the country. The principles 
recommended for Russia's policy were then stated by the chairman of the 
executive committee of the NPSR, Gennady Semigin. They included 
"responsibility for the fate of the state, the protection of people's interests and the 
rights and freedoms of citizens, social justice and sensible state regulation of the 
economy." These could be further explored in the 68 bills that the NPSR had 
prepared "on all the key issues relating to the life of the state and society." The 
chairman of the State Duma, Gennady Seleznev, in his turn, said that building 
intelligent relations between the state, the labor collectives and the trade unions, 
as well as active participation by the state in the management of the economy, 
would require "a complicated range of legal acts." (ITAR-TASS, 1111 GMT, 29 
Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0929, via World News Connection) 
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FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Making trouble... 
Meanwhile, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) also has been visible. 
On 28 September, about 70 activists held a previously sanctioned rally outside 
the US embassy in Moscow to protest American military action "against the 
Islamic world." At the rally, LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky warned against 
having Russia "pulled into a scenario thrust on it by certain political forces from 
outside or involved in retaliatory actions." He claimed that the "Americans are 
acting slyly, and they have not taken part in anything so far, while Russia could 
be pulled into a bloody war in Central Asia." In such a case, Zhirinovsky stated, 
Russia would "lose its authority," as it already has "by supporting forces in 
Afghanistan that nobody cares for." (INTERFAX, 1247 GMT, 28 Sep 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0928, via World News Connection) 
 
The protest was held shortly after the defeat (by a vote of 2 to 79) of a draft 
resolution advising President Vladimir Putin "to initiate at the UN Security Council 
the lifting of sanctions imposed against several countries," to request the 
electronic media "to refrain from the frequent demonstration of violence and 
terrorism" and to declare that retaliatory strikes on Afghanistan are inadmissible. 
(INTERFAX, 1407 GMT, 26 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0926, via World News 
Connection) The draft was submitted by LDPR deputy Alexei Mitrofanov, who 
made such a scene after the vote that Seleznev barred him from speaking in the 
Duma for a month. (ITAR-TASS, 1544 GMT, 26 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0926, 
via World News Connection)  
 
REGIONS 
Making copies... 
In the Rostov region, Governor Vladimir Chub was re-elected in a landslide, 
collecting more than 76 percent of the vote, while the runner-up, deputy head of 
the Zimovnikovsky District administration, Petr Voloshin, received only 7 percent. 
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(ITAR-TASS, 2258 GMT, 23 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0924, via World News 
Connection) On the eve of the election, however, a "provocation" took place in 
the mining city of Novoshakhtinsk. Leaflets were posted widely, urging the 
population to vote against Chub. These colored photocopies allegedly were 
signed by the Novoshakhtinsk mayor, but the business manager of the 
Novoshakhtinsk administration, Viktor Shevelev, refuted official involvement in 
the publication of "such literature." 
 
The matter was handed over to the local prosecutor's office, which has begun a 
criminal investigation. (INTERFAX, 0947 GMT, 23 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0923, via World News Connection) 
 
MEDIA 
According to the newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta, other "dirty tricks" and "black 
PR" have become a problem in election campaigns. Especially nasty content 
appears in the "black newspapers" that generally appear two to three months 
before the official start of an election race. The publications are placed in 
mailboxes, have patriotic-sounding titles and resemble the propaganda of the 
"pre-revolutionary underground." Similar articles appear throughout the regions, 
and their authors often are "the same traveling Moscow journalists." The 
publications generally fall into three categories: those that "besmirch the honor 
and dignity" of candidates and current governors; those glorifying the "honest 
and uncompromising" who enjoy "the unconditional support of President Putin," 
and those that purport to be "letters and replies from readers." 
 
These pamphlets, according to Rossiiskaya gazeta, disappear immediately after 
the elections and, while not necessarily effective, they are very difficult to 
combat. (ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, 2 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1002, via World 
News Connection) 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
Rags to riches? 
Three weeks ago Russian foreign policy was in a defensive crouch. President 
Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov were making every effort to 
respond on two main fronts. First, at every available opportunity Putin and Ivanov 
put every sort of pressure possible on the US National Missile Defense (NMD) 
program. They blamed it for being a destabilizing influence on everything from 
from peace in the Middle East (ITAR-TASS, 1422 GMT, 1 Sep 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets) to the Olympic Games (PRAVDA, 7 Sep 01). Second, the 
foreign policy of Russia was focused on limiting NATO expansion. The Baltic 
states were poised to join NATO sometime in early 2002 with Bulgaria and 
Romania poised to make a strong bid by 2004. At the same time Russia was 
trying to maintain some level of leadership over the particularly foreign policy 
among the CIS and non-CIS former Soviet states and struggling with the drain of 
the war in Chechnya -- all this in the context of a weak economy, weak military, 
and increasingly taking retrograde steps in terms of openness, freedom of the 
press, and individual rights. And then the terrorist attacks happened in the US on 
11 September and everything changed. 
 
Now, Putin and Ivanov are the toast of the international community. They are 
consulted by the US president and secretary of state. The Russian leaders have 
been to Washington and Putin just returned from, by all accounts, an extremely 
successful trip to Germany where he not only met with national and business 
leaders, but he even addressed the German Bundestag in what was described 
as perfect German. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 Sep 01) The results of this 
newfound importance have been profound. The US, through Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, has endorsed the Russian war in Chechnya as a fight against 
terrorism (see THE NIS OBSERVED, 26 Sep 01), thereby giving Russia free rein 
in the region. The new US sentiment on this score has been echoed by the 
 6 
German, French, and NATO leadership. (NATO HOMEPAGE, 4 Oct 01) The 
European Union also has softened its stance toward Russia with regard to the 
Chechen war. Even more striking is the fact that France, the most constant and 
harshest critic of Russian excesses in Chechnya, has agreed to tone down its 
comments toward this issue. (LE MONDE, 27 Sep 01; via lemonde.fr) In addition, 
when considering basing in any post-Soviet country, both Powell and Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld confirmed that Russia would be consulted as 
negotiations proceeded. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 26 Sep 01) Putin delivered 
the final tour de force during his visit to NATO on 3 October when he alluded to 
the idea that Russia might even consider itself as a candidate member to NATO. 
(NATO HOMEPAGE, 4 Oct 01) Finally, Moscow has gone to the forefront of 
attempting Middle East and even Israeli-Palestinian mediation and has tried to 
become a regional power broker among Arab states. 
 
Why the sudden shift? The reasons are twofold. First, Putin has shown himself 
very skilled at taking advantage of any situation. He was able to salvage a public 
relations nightmare in the sinking of the Kursk and to retain public confidence. In 
a recent poll Russian children even say Putin is "cool." (ITAR-TASS, 08 Sep 01; 
via ISI Emerging Markets) He has been successful also at working with Western 
politicians. This is mainly due to his KGB background and training along with his 
longtime posting in Germany. Second, the West needs Russia right now, or at 
least the West believes it needs Russia. This is true of both Western perception 
of Russian regional influence (even hegemony) over the post-Soviet space and 
of the Russian sponsorship of the Northern Alliance opposition forces in 
Afghanistan. Finally it is important to note that with the focus of world attention on 
the Middle East, the Russians have one of the most experienced hands in the 
region, Yevgeny Primakov. He is believed to have extensive contact networks in 
the area (including a close personal relationship with Saddam Hussein) and the 
ability to exploit them successfully. (BBC WORLD SERVICE, 17 Aug 00; via ISI 
Emerging Markets) In the end, Russia is making the most of extraordinary 
opportunity and will continue to feature prominently as this crisis develops. 
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Arms deal with Iran 
In another change, abandoning the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, Moscow has 
inked a major arms deal with Teheran for an estimated $7 billion. (INTERFAX, 
0937 GMT, 4 Oct 01; via ISI Emerging Markets) Included in the deal are some of 
Russia's best gear, such as Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets, Ka-50 and Ka-52 
helicopters, and T-90 and T-82U tanks. This is particularly significant for both 
countries. For the Russians it holds much promise. First, Iran will pay cash, a 
commodity in short supply in Moscow. Second, it opens additional opportunities 
for expanded markets throughout the region. A successful delivery to Iran 
certainly will impress its neighbors and perhaps entice them also to seek a deal. 
For the Iranians it is equally important. Such a deal further cracks Western 
pressure on its economy via sanctions. (IRNA, 1808 GMT, 4 Oct 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets) Since it is not able to get access to the best Western military 
technology, the Russian equipment will provide Iran with its first major upgrade 
since the revolution of 1979. Iran also will become a much more powerful nation 
able to threaten the Straits of Hormuz with advanced fighters, missiles, and 
vastly improved radar. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Walter Jackson 
 
Not in my backyard 
As US coalition building continues, Russian President Vladimir Putin has 
struggled to maintain Russian politico-military dominance in Central Asia and, at 
the same time, keep the Russian economy pumped up. Russia continues its 
attempt to dictate the direction of regional support to the anti-terrorist efforts. 
Russian Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin said in a press conference 
in Yerevan on 3 October that he didn't believe that there was any reason for the 
US to use military airfields on Uzbek and Tajik territory for launching air strikes 
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into Afghanistan. He also stated that the US had asked for the use of bases and 
air corridors for logistical support only. Keeping a low profile, he reiterated that 
Russian military hardware and personnel were not being used in the retaliatory 
action in Afghanistan. Russia was only engaged in the exchange of information 
concerning the presence of terrorist organizations and different facilities in 
Afghanistan, Kvashnin said. (INTERFAX, 1646 GMT, 3 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1003, via World News Connection) Although Russia purportedly speaks for CIS 
members, behind the scenes the US and UK apparently continue to insert 
special operating forces and reconnaissance infrastructure around and within 
Afghanistan. 
 
Money talks 
Ironically, as much of the international community struggles to put the lid on 
terrorism, Russia signed an agreement on military and technological sales to a 
state known to sponsor terrorism -- Iran. Meanwhile, the State Duma defense 
committee chairman, Army General Andrei Nikolaev, said that Russia will not be 
involved directly in possible US combat actions in Afghanistan but is ready to 
provide support to the Northern Alliance. (ITAR-TASS, 1820 GMT, 3 Oct 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-1003, via World News Connection) Russia and Iran both 
support the Afghani Northern Alliance. Russia goes a little further by allowing 
corridors through its airspace for NATO and US humanitarian aid to the starving 
Afghani population. 
 
During his recent visit to Moscow, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami met 
with President Putin; together they reached an agreement on defense 
cooperation (including weapons sales, expansion of nuclear power plant 
construction, and other technology transfers) that could net billions in revenue to 
the Russian defense industry. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and his 
Iranian counterpart, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, signed the agreement on 2 
October. Russia has long ignored US demands to stop selling weapons and 
military (especially nuclear) technology to Iran. To date Tehran has maintained 
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an unwavering policy opposing US military engagements in Afghanistan. Besides 
the basics of supply and demand, the foreign policy goals of Russia and Iran, at 
the moment, do not seem to coincide, especially in terms of perceived threats. 
Given its support of the Northern Alliance, clearly Russia sees the Taliban as a 
terrorist group; however, Moscow has worked strenuously to convince the 
international community that Chechen rebels also fall into the terrorist category. 
According to Shamkhani, Iran's view is radically different. "Iran has suffered 
greatly from international terrorism, and... the 'university of international terrorism' 
is Israel" he claimed. (IRNA, 1618 GMT, 2 Oct 01; FBIS-NES-2001-1002, via 
World News Connection). 
 
Russia's definition of terrorists appears, on the surface at least, to differ less from 
Western definitions (with the exception of the inclusion of Chechen rebels -- until 
Colin Powell's resent acquiescence, at least). However, economics clearly 
trumps any other considerations for Moscow. By transferring nuclear technology 
(that is, helping build a nuclear power plant) at the military complex in Bushehr, 
and agreeing to sell modern fighter aircraft and long-range air-defense systems, 
Russia is promoting the development of a well-armed modern nuclear power that 
sees Israel as the central enemy in the region. President George W. Bush's 
assertion that the US will seek out all states that support terrorism earned an 
interesting response from a Russian official this week. "A Western attack on Iraq, 
in revenge for the 11 September terrorist attacks, would result in a sharply 
negative reaction from Moscow," according to Aleksandr Shein, Russian 
Ambassador to Iraq. (INTERFAX, 2 Oct 01; via Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
Newsline) 
 
Russian-Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet exercise 
Russian and Ukrainian naval forces completed a joint peace-keeping exercise, 
Peace Keep 2001, in the Black Sea on 28 September. This exercise included 24 
warships and 31 support vessels conducting missile, torpedo and depth-charge 
firings, 700 marines conducting an amphibious assault landing, and a missile 
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launch from the Caspian shore.(ITAR-TASS, 1208 GMT, 28 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0928, via World News Connection) The successful completion of this 
exercise clearly bolstered -- at least the Ukrainian portion -- of Russia's recent 
efforts to solidify the CIS organization. 
 
Russian submarine launch delayed 
The launch of the latest Russian nuclear-powered submarine had been delayed 
pending the successful recovery of (a portion of) the Russian submarine Kursk. 
Recovery operations were hampered by weather and other technical difficulties 
in the Barents Sea, as winter weather approached. Reportedly ready for service, 
the latest Russian submarine likely will be launched this week. The Gepard 
series 12,700-ton nuclear submarine can travel at a maximum speed of 33 knots 
at a depth of 600 meters with a crew of 63 men. (ITAR-TASS, 1143 GMT, 1 Oct 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1001, via World News Connection) In the aftermath of the 
terrible loss of the Kursk and her crew last year, and the poor handling of the 
attempted rescue, the Russian submarine force needs this shot in the arm. In an 
apparent attempt to deflect criticism, several other Russian theories continue to 
circulate as to the cause of the Kursk sinking -- the leading one remains that a 
collision with a foreign (US or UK) submarine actually caused the accident. The 
most likely scenario, however, remains an explosion in the forward section of the 
Kursk, the theory that both the US and UK support. It is indeed unfortunate that 
President Putin hasn't figured out yet that sometimes it is just best to accept 
responsibility for the accident, and to take action to ensure it doesn't happen 
again -- that would probably go much further in satisfying the families of the 
Kursk's crew. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
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Yes... no... well, maybe... 
 
Ukraine may not be participating in operations against Afghanistan; nonetheless, 
the country is dealing with a number of questions about its military capabilities. 
The questions started just days before the beginning of the US-led air strikes in 
Afghanistan when, during military exercises, Ukraine inadvertently may have shot 
down a Russian TU-154 passenger plane flying over the Black Sea on its way 
from Tel Aviv to Novosibirsk. The crash killed 78 persons. Although Ukrainian 
officials now deny their missile hit the plane, the pattern of events corresponds 
closely to another wayward missile incident just 18 months ago. That first 
incident resulted in four deaths when a Tochka-U surface-to-surface missile 
smashed into an apartment building near Kyiv in April 2000. 
 
Immediately following the explosion in the apartment complex, a "high-ranking 
source" within the interior ministry said "it was a missile," which was fired from 30 
kilometers away during test-firing exercises, that caused the disaster. (ITAR-
TASS, 1928 GMT, 21 Apr 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0421, via World News 
Connection) Just hours later, however, the defense ministry refuted that 
suggestion, saying that a bomb may have caused the explosion. "All missiles 
launched during the exercise," a ministry spokesman said, "hit the set tasks at 
the training ground." (KOMMERSANT DAILY, 3 May 00; Defense and Security, 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
Similarly, immediately following the crash of the Russian airliner into the Black 
Sea on the morning of 4 October 2001, a Ukrainian navy official told reporters 
that the plane indeed had been shot down by Ukraine. "I can hardly believe it," 
Igor Larichev said, "but a Ukrainian missile shot down the plane." He continued, 
"The firing of missiles with a range of 400 kilometers took place in the course of 
an anti-air attack exercise in the Feodosia in Crimea." Those exercises, he said, 
resulted in the errant missile. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 4 Oct 01; via lexis-
nexis) But after Larichev's statement, the defense ministry quickly disavowed his 
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assertion. Russian Navy Spokesman Igor Dygalo (incidentally, the same 
spokesman who denied the missile theory in 2000) told reporters that Larichev 
never actually said what he said and must have been misquoted. (INTERFAX, 
1721 GMT, 4 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1004, via World News Connection) 
Further, the ministry announced in a statement that "all missiles hit the targets in 
the designated area." Sound familiar? (ITAR-TASS, 2120 GMT, 4 Oct 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-1004, via World News Connection) 
 
In both cases, evidence quickly became available suggesting that missiles 
actually were responsible for the catastrophes. A missile launch just moments 
before the Russian plane exploded and crashed a week ago, for example, was 
reportedly picked up by at least one US intelligence satellite. Citing this satellite 
evidence, an unnamed US official told Agence France Presse, "At the moment 
we believe it was shot down by the Ukrainian" authorities. (AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, 5 Oct 01; via lexis-nexis) Additionally, according to the head of 
Russia's Security Council, rescue vessels have collected debris that seems to 
contradict Ukrainian denials. Vladimir Rushailo said, "There are objects which 
have been found which were not related to a plane." (REUTERS, 0645 EST, 6 
Oct 01; via Yahoo! News) 
 
Still, Ukrainian officials cling to their denials, although their stance seems to have 
softened slightly over the last several days. To bolster their case, on 8 October 
military officials showed a video to reporters; the video, they said, would show 
that their missiles could not have reached the plane. Most reporters who 
attended the press conference seemed unconvinced. But perhaps they're simply 
jaded. This recent demonstration was similar to one conducted in April 2000 after 
the first missile incident. According to Kommersant-Daily, at that time, officials 
"demonstrated to the press a mortar charge allegedly found at the site of the 
incident" to suggest that the explosion was caused by illegal ammunition housed 
in the building. (KOMMERSANT DAILY, 3 May 00; Defense and Security, via 
lexis-nexis) 
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Because of the nature of the first incident, however, the government's attempts to 
deny responsibility were dismissed relatively quickly, and the military was forced 
to concede its mistake. Unlike the unrecoverable plane wreckage at the bottom 
of the Black Sea, the evidence from the apartment building was readily available 
not only to officials, but also to reporters. On 24 April, therefore, the military 
admitted that a missile had caused the explosion. So, why the delay in 
announcing this? "It was difficult," Ministry of Defense Spokesman Sergei 
Nagorzansky said, "to establish whether or not our rocket was responsible, 
because the destruction to the building was so great." (DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, 0845 CET, 24 Apr 00; via lexis-nexis) Of course, Nagorzansky did 
not discuss the statements issued days before by the interior ministry -- and 
quickly denied by defense officials -- acknowledging that a missile was involved. 
Perhaps he felt it was better for the world to believe that Ukraine simply lost a 
rocket for over three days. 
 
But by comparison, three days was no time at all. It has now been almost a week 
since the Russian plane went down. And Russia appears to be getting slightly 
annoyed. Directly following the crash, Russian President Vladimir Putin rushed to 
defend his friend, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, who had expressed his 
confidence that a Ukrainian missile did not hit the plane. (See UKRAINIAN 
NEWS, 7 Oct 01; via ISI Emerging Markets) Echoing Kuchma, Putin said, "The 
weapons that were being used during this exercise could not reach the area 
where out TU-154 was flying." He added, "What I told you as of this moment is 
based on what our Ukrainian partners have told us and we don't have any reason 
not to trust them." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2003 EST, 4 Oct 01; via Yahoo! 
News) But gradually, Putin has shifted his stance. Now, he is requesting 
additional data on the exercises. The question now becomes -- is this information 
really necessary? 
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It is, in fact, likely, given the close cooperation of the two militaries, that Russian 
military officials already are in possession of most of the information about the 
exercise. More importantly, Russian observers were on hand for the exercise, 
and quickly supported Ukrainian statements that a missile could not have hit the 
plane. Instead they hinted, perhaps it was terrorism. Putin himself suggested 
such a possibility, despite the absence of any evidence to support the idea. "It is 
possible," he said, "that it is the result of a terrorist act." (IBID.) But, while a 
terrorist attack would have spared Russian-Ukrainian relations and created a 
better tactical position for Putin in his quest to control certain insurgent groups, 
the idea was quickly dismissed thanks to US satellite information. Therefore, 
Ukraine is left -- as in 2000 -- to decide between admitting incompetence or 
admitting deception. 
 
Perhaps in a few days, the Ukrainian military will discover that it can't account for 
one missile after all. Until then, the families of 78 people will be left to wonder 
how they lost their loved ones and why no one will explain it to them. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Preliminary talks held 
Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, the presidential representative to the Southern district, 
has held a number of conversations with Akhmed Zakaev, who has been 
designated by President Aslan Maskhadov to open discussions. This follows on 
President Putin's 24 September statement calling on the Chechen resistance to 
surrender their weapons and to contact Kazantsev to begin talks. Although only a 
few weapons were collected, preliminary talks to define the time and location of a 
future meeting have been held. However, fighting continued as Chechen units 
temporarily occupied several towns on 29-30 September. After the Chechen 
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units withdrew, the Russian armed forces subjected the inhabitants to another 
round of "cleansing." 
 
Roman Khalilov, head of Political Affairs in the Chechen foreign ministry, on 4 
October commented on these events to the NIS Observed. He said that the start 
of a political dialogue has had no impact on the situation on the ground. "The 
talks so far concern modalities for a meeting between Kazantsev and President 
Maskhadov's representative, Akhmed Zakaev. The military operations 
undertaken last week were planned in advance of President Putin's statements. 
The fighting and the cleansings that followed them are in fact routine. The 
situation did not get worse. And in principle, it does not seem that it can get 
worse. After the brutalities in Alleroi or Assinovskaya it is not possible to speak of 
deteriorating conditions." 
 
As for the direction the talks could take, Mr. Khalilov said, "No Chechen politician 
will abandon the goal of independence. Maskhadov will not do this, nor will 
anyone else. Even if there was a leader willing to do so, he simply would not be 
able to because this would mean ceasing to be a leader. It is too late: Too much 
wrong has been done to the Chechens. At the same time, obtaining 
independence is a process. And the key in the short term is to stabilize 
Chechnya. We can not afford to return to the situation of 1996 when we were 
blockaded and isolated -- in the initial phases the main goal is to end Chechnya's 
isolation. There has to be access to international institutions and foreign states 
so that the process of restoration of the republic can begin." 
 
Moscow wants to pull out of Chechnya? 
For the first time in two years of war talks are being held on the president's 
explicit instructions. Two session of talks between Russian Duma deputies and 
Chechen representatives have been acknowledged publicly, more, probably, 
were held in secret. Although those efforts reflect a widespread public weariness 
with the war, they garnered only wrath from the executive. Why is Putin, who only 
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weeks ago lambasted Duma Deputy Boris Nemtsov for daring to suggest a 
negotiated peace, suddenly looking for a way out of Chechnya? 
 
Pavel Felgenhauer, a highly respected defense analyst, has suggested that 
Moscow would prefer to lessen Russia's military presence in Chechnya so that 
more Russian troops and weapons could be sent to Afghanistan: "The roots of 
the Chechen resistance are located in Chechnya, weapons and military supplies 
are purchased in Russia on the black market, from the manufacturers, military 
units or in Chechnya in the zone of military activity. Financial means are 'earned' 
partially from the illegal oil business in Chechnya, and is partially collected from 
the Chechen diaspora in Russia, Turkey, and the Middle East." (MOSKOVSKIYE 
NOVOSTI, 2 Oct 01) 
 
After noting that Maskhadov will seek a Russian military withdrawal from 
Chechnya, Felgenhauer says, "At present Moscow is just as interested as 
Maskhadov in a partial pullout of forces from Chechnya. All we have in Central 
Asia is the small 201st division, which is splintered into many tactical groups In 
effect there are no strategic reserves at all Last week began an emergency 
transfer of 1,500 contract soldiers to the 201st, which normally does not exceed 
5,000 men." In Afghanistan, Russia not only has been covertly arming and 
equipping the Northern Alliance but Russian specialists, advisors, pilots and 
other armed services personnel have taken an active part in the conflict since 
1996.  
 
The US and the UK have begun to bomb targets in Afghanistan with the apparent 
aim of severely impairing the Taliban, if not altogether removing it from power. 
Moreover, the US has landed forces in Uzbekistan (the first such engagement 
with a post-Soviet state), and has identified the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
along with Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad as serious terrorist challengers 
to the world order. The US actions will reorder the security framework of Central 
Asia. If Russia could participate fully in the military operations, it would have 
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more levers to frame the post-war arrangement. Instead, Russian forces remain 
mired in Chechnya. 
 
Perhaps these frustrations can explain the rather odd comments from 
Kazantsev's deputy, Nikolai Britvin. Asked to comment on the 29-30 September 
coordinated assault by the Chechen resistance on four villages of Shali, 
Kurchaloi, Avtury and Serzhen-yurt during which members of the pro-Russian 
administration were killed, Britvin said: "We deliberately watched these latest 
events: We didn't involve the armed forces in the fighting. The battles, as I 
already pointed out, were carried out by the local police units, the Chechens 
themselves," and "This shows that local organs are capable of carrying on the 
fight against the bandits." (KOMMERSANT, 2 Oct 01) 
 
Cleansings against population continue 
Far from confronting the Chechen fighters, the Russian armed forces returned to 
the villages after the fighters had left and then started to carry out punitive 
operations against the inhabitants. "The federals returned to the Shali region on 
Sunday and began cleansings on Monday," Kommersant reported on 2 October. 
Those operations are still underway and have already resulted in killings, 
disappearances and increased numbers of refugees from the area. 
 
The Grozny-Shali road has been blockaded for two days by residents of 
Prigorodnoe village who are protesting the killing of a ten-year-old boy, who died 
as a result of artillery barrage against his home. (RADIO LIBERTY, 8 Oct 01) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
President Nazarbaev continues his foreign policy balancing act 
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In a reciprocal visit, planned since German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's 
tour of Central Asia in May 2001, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev arrived 
in Berlin on 1 October, accompanied by Economy and Trade Minister Zhaksybek 
Kulekeyev and National Bank Chairman Grigory Marchenko, to meet with 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, President Johannes Rau, Defense Minister 
Rudolf Scharping, and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. 
 
While the current terrorism crisis certainly was discussed, with Germany 
promising to provide aid for the refugees Kazakhstan expects from Afghanistan, 
it was not the only issue on the table. 
 
The agreements signed in Berlin included a treaty on security cooperation, under 
which Germany will provide assistance to improve Kazakhstan's customs and 
border controls, and Kazakh officers will be allowed to train at Germany's military 
schools. (MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, 5 Oct 01; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
However, it is clear that Nazarbaev is fully aware that he cannot stray too far 
from the Russian line in security-related areas. Therefore, the Kazakh president 
has sought to channel his foreign policy efforts into matters civil and economic. 
 
To that end, Nazarbaev, in recent weeks, has embarked on a campaign to attract 
and secure foreign investment. Most notable of these efforts, in terms of civil 
society, is the planned creation in Kazakhstan of a branch of the Aga Khan 
Foundation's Central Asian University, which will provide approximately US $5 
million in educational and developmental funds. Nazarbaev, while in Berlin, met 
informally with the Aga Khan, in order to discuss the project. (EURASIA 
INSIGHT, Kazakhstan Daily Digest, 4 Oct 01; via Eurasianet) 
 
While such projects are important in their own right, it is clear that Nazarbaev's 
priorities lie in attracting more state and private investment. In an interview with 
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the German newspaper Der Spiegel prior to his departure for Berlin, Nazarbaev 
expressed his desire to make Germany the "Central Economic Partner of the 
Future" for his country, and to lure Kazakh émigrés back to their homeland. (DER 
SPIEGEL, 24 Sep 01; FBIS-NES-2001-0924, via World News Connection,) 
 
Although Germany is one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan, with an annual 
trade turnover of DM 280 million, the United States remains the number-one 
target of Nazarbaev's overtures. Kazakhstan has attracted American interest 
because of its Caspian oil and gas resources. Until now, these have been 
transported mainly over Russian Territory through the Tengiz-Novorosiisk 
pipeline. However, this may change soon. On 4 October, Kazakh national 
company Oil and Gas Transport (TNG) signed a deal with US Gulf Interstate 
Engineering Co. to explore how best to involve Kazakhstan in the Baku-Tblisi-
Ceyhan pipeline project. The project involves researching the possibility and 
feasibility of constructing an undersea pipeline to Baku, or of transporting oil to 
Baku by tanker. Part of the research project will be funded by a $346,000 
research grant from the US government. (INTERFAX, 4 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1004, via World News Connection) 
 
Recent policy and tax changes, seen by many as an attempt to establish 
government control over oil exports, have worried foreign investors, and 
Nazarbaev's government has swung its PR machine into action in an attempt to 
allay fears over regional stability and the atmosphere for investments. 
 
Speaking in Boston on 29 September, Nazarbaev's energy advisor, Nurlan 
Kapparov, assured investors that the situation in the region, and forthcoming tax 
legislation, will pose no difficulties for investments. (KAZAKH COMMERCIAL TV 
REPORT, 29 Sep 01, via BBC Monitoring)  
 
America rapidly has become a target of Kazakh foreign policy efforts, because 
Nazarbaev believes he has much to gain from cooperating with the United States 
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against Afghanistan. A few days before Nazarbaev travelled to Berlin, his foreign 
minister, Yerian Isidrov, was in Washington for extensive consultations with 
Secretary of State Colin Powell. These talks reaffirmed Kazakh support for the 
US; Isidrov stated that the meeting had not touched on technical questions such 
as the use of bases, but that with regard to all actions being planned, "the 
structures concerned are cooperating." (ITAR-TASS, 29 Sep 01; via BBC 
Monitoring) Isidrov also stated that he had issued an invitation to Colin Powell, on 
behalf of President Nazarbaev, to visit Kazakhstan early in November. As yet, it 
is unclear whether this invitation has been accepted or declined. Current 
developments only serve to show that Nazarbaev has every intention of 
continuing his policy of balancing his reliance on Russia for security, with 
economic interest from Europe and the United States. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
The risk of current coalition building 
The recent detente between Russia and the NATO, which developed in the wake 
of the 11 September attacks in New York and Washington DC, has played a 
significant role in the US efforts of coalition building. However, the Baltic states 
are hoping nervously that in a new effort to placate Russia, the West does not 
abandon the already concrete goal of including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 
the NATO military alliance. 
 
Recently in Germany and at the EU-Russia summit in Brussels, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin suggested that Russia may change its negative stance 
toward the NATO enlargement, and may even consider eventually joining the 
alliance. In spite of the wording, this statement was not as supportive of the 
alliance as some thought initially. Putin went on to call on the alliance to become 
a political organization and to say that, in such an eventuality, Russia might wish 
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to join. His implication, of course, was that Russia might soften its opposition to 
the Baltic states' inclusion in NATO if Russia were given a definitive say in the 
alliance. It seems that many do not see the problems of this tango with Russia. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell welcomed Putin's statement about the need for 
"NATO's evolution," and even called it "very meaningful." (ITAR-TASS, 0843 
GMT, 04 Oct 01; via BBC Worldwide Monitoring) It seems that Russia has found 
itself in a most advantageous position since the terrorist devastation in the US, 
and certainly President Vladimir Putin and Russian diplomats have not hesitated 
to take advantage of the several opportunities that the concept of coalition 
building has presented to them. 
 
The Baltic countries react 
Despite NATO Secretary-General George Robertson's assurances that stronger 
Russian ties will have no impact on NATO's enlargement process (anticipated to 
continue at the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002), it is clear that the 
Baltic countries are anxious to ensure that the previous pace of NATO 
enlargement will remain constant. All three countries have stated that they are 
ready to act according to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (even though they are not 
yet NATO members) and to fulfill their obligation as members of the international 
coalition. Moreover, they have announced that they would open their airspace to 
NATO and US aircraft (although with varying conditions). Lastly, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania have submitted their NATO Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for 
the year 2002, each outlining a more aggressive plan toward NATO integration, 
and addressing previous problems in their respective NATO bids. 
 
In Lithuania, a poll conducted by Rinkos Tyrimai polling company shows the 
number of Lithuanians in favor of joining NATO after the US attacks has grown to 
63.1 percent. (BNS, 1523 GMT, 20 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0920, via World 
News Connection) The Lithuanian delegation at the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly session, which ran from 5-9 October in Ottawa, Canada, tried to 
persuade the participants to continue enlargement at the 2002 Prague NATO 
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summit. The chairman of the Seimas Foreign Affairs Committee, Gediminas 
Kirkilas, served as the head of the delegation which prepared amendments to 
clarify ambiguous wordings in documents relating to enlargement. Additionally, 
"all reports and resolutions related to the alliance's enlargement" were discussed 
at the assembly's political committee, because the Lithuanian delegation was 
concerned that "some wording in the documents might be interpreted as 
proposals to slow down NATO's enlargement in the nearest future." (BNS, 1457 
GMT, 4 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1004, via World News Connection) 
 
Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga has underscored the readiness of the 
Baltic states to join NATO at the alliance's next summit. According to a poll 
conducted by the market and public opinion studies center SKDS, 59.4 percent 
of Latvian citizens now say that it is in Latvia's interest to enter NATO as soon as 
possible. This reflects an increase of almost 6 percent from the same poll taken 
earlier this year. Additionally, Latvia hosted an international conference in Riga 
on 21 September called NATO Enlargement: From Washington to Prague. The 
conference focused on boosting international dialogue on issues pertaining to 
NATO integration and the potential role of NATO applicant countries. Prime 
Minister Andris Berzins emphasized that participation in NATO is all the more 
important in the wake of the terrorist attacks.  
 
In Estonia, although the new president, Arnold Ruutel, has been seeking better 
relations with Russia, Simmu Tiik, Estonian foreign counselor to Prime Minister 
Mart Laar, responded to Putin's statements in Brussels by saying that "Russia 
has been seeking a greater right to have a say in NATO matters since the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact.... This is no breakthough for the Baltic states." 
(ETA, 1058 GMT, 4 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1004, via World News Connection) 
 
In general, it might be noted that the very goal of a coalition reflects the 
temporary confluence of influence and interests, often to the expense of 
abandoning vital elements of mutual responsibility and careful, long-term plans. 
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Powell's opinion is that NATO enlargement should be conducted in a way that no 
nation would regard it as a threat to itself. In this case, changing the nature of 
NATO from a military to a mostly political alliance and/or inviting Russia to join, 
apart from abandoning NATO's basic mission, also would remove the incentive of 
most of the aspirant countries to become members. An alliance cannot be 
inocuous to everyone and still remain effective. Allowing Russia into the alliance 
or pandering to its "fears" regarding the nature of the alliance may contribute to 
the new coalition, but it also will undermine NATO. Accordingly, courting Russia's 
support of the West's newly declared "war on terrorism" could stop the previous 
momentum generated to invite the three Baltic countries into the most enduring 
alliance in modern history. Many persons, such as German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder, and even US Secretary of State Colin Powell, may view the present 
detente as healing old "Cold War" wounds at last. Others, aware of the fact that 
Russia is nowhere near meeting any of the criteria to join NATO (no rule of law, 
no reform of the military, bloody ethnic war in Chechnya, still selling arms and 
technology to Iran, etc.) see that Putin is seizing this perfect opportunity to 
weaken NATO and to stop the momentum for including the Baltic states in the 
alliance. 
 
It would be a tragedy for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania if a temporary coalition 
were to take precedence over the fundamentals of long-term alliance-building for 
which they have worked so hard. 
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